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ABSTRACT. During the late 1990s, an interim payment system (IPS) was instituted to constrain 
Medicare home health care expenditures. Previous research has largely focused on the 
implications of the IPS for Medicare patients, but our study broadens the analysis to consider 
patients with other payer sources. Using the National Home and Hospice Care Survey, we found 
similar effects of the IPS across payer types. Specifically, the IPS was associated with a decrease 
in access to care for the sickest patients, less agency assistance with activities of daily living, and 
shorter length-of-use. However, these changes did not translate into worse discharge outcomes. 
  1Introduction 
Prior to the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, home health agencies were paid on the 
basis of their costs, up to pre-established per-visit limits. Under this system, agencies could 
enhance their revenues by providing a greater number of beneficiaries with additional visits. 
Over the period 1990 through 1997, Medicare home health expenditures grew annually at a rate 
of more than three times that of the rest of the Medicare program (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 2000). The number of home health care users per 1,000 beneficiaries increased from 57 to 
109, and the average number of visits per user doubled from 36 to 73.  
The 1997 BBA changed Medicare home health eligibility and coverage rules and 
reformed the payment methodology by instituting a prospective payment system (PPS) for home 
health care reimbursement (Komisar 2002). Implemented on October 1, 2000, Medicare pays 
home health agencies a set payment rate for each 60-day episode of care, regardless of the 
specific services delivered. While the PPS was being developed, the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) instituted an interim payment system (IPS). The IPS was phased in 
beginning October 1997 with the start of each agency’s cost reporting period, and it constrained 
agency reimbursement by reducing the per visit payment limit and introducing an annual per-
beneficiary cap.
1
Previous work has shown that the payment changes introduced in the IPS were associated 
with large decreases in Medicare utilization and expenditures (McCall et al. 2003b; Murkofsky et 
al. 2003). Specifically, there was a 22 percent decrease in the proportion of beneficiaries using 
home health services, a 39 percent decrease in the number of visits per user, and a 27 percent 
decrease in the length of use. Interestingly, the decrease in utilization under the IPS has not been 
  2found to correspond to a decrease in patient outcomes, including functioning, mortality, use of 
hospital and emergency care or patient satisfaction (McCall et al. 2003a, 2004). 
However, there has been relatively little research addressing whether the changes under 
the IPS had implications for other payer groups. Because Medicare is the dominant payer of 
services, the payment changes introduced under the IPS may have affected the care of home 
health patients with other payer sources. We explore legal, economic and behavioral 
explanations below for why an agency may value treating all patients according to the same 
criteria. Alternatively, the decreased generosity of Medicare under the IPS may have led to the 
increased utilization of non-Medicare services if payer sources such as Medicaid and private 
insurance function as potential substitutes for Medicare.  
Given the potential implications of the IPS for non-Medicare home health patients, the 
omission of these patients from prior analyses may yield misleading policy implications. Using a 
national survey of current and discharged home health patients, our study examines the 
implications of the IPS for the entire home health care sector.  
Conceptual Framework 
We hypothesize that the IPS provided strong economic incentives to home health 
agencies towards the care of Medicare patients. Specifically, we posit that the IPS had 
implications for access to care for the sickest patients, the intensity of services delivered, the 
length of use and the outcome at the time of discharge. We present hypotheses regarding the 
effect of the IPS on each of these outcomes for Medicare patients before turning to the potential 
implications for non-Medicare patients. 
A primary policy concern under the IPS was access to home health care, particularly for 
the sickest beneficiaries requiring the most costly medical care (U.S. General Accounting Office 
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introduction of the per-beneficiary cap, agencies had a strong incentive to accept healthier 
Medicare patients needing fewer resources. Indeed, a Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC) sponsored survey indicated that some agencies were no longer taking patients they 
previously would have admitted (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 1999). Specifically, 
the survey suggested that long-term or chronic care patients were less likely to be admitted by 
these agencies as a result of the IPS.  Thus, we predict that the IPS decreased access for those 
sickest home health care patients.  
Once patients were admitted, there was an incentive under the IPS to provide fewer 
services, because the marginal revenue associated with the provision of additional services had 
decreased. Once again, the results of the MedPAC (1999) survey suggested that certain agencies 
responded to the IPS by providing fewer services per user relative to the pre-IPS period. Thus, 
we predict that home health agencies provided fewer services to Medicare patients under the IPS.  
Similarly, the payment cap under the IPS entailed that the marginal revenue associated 
with additional days of care was also lower, providing an incentive to discharge Medicare 
patients earlier. Thus, we hypothesize that the IPS was associated with a decreased length of use 
among Medicare patients. Finally, depending on the marginal productivity of the home health 
services eliminated under the IPS, there may be implications of the policy change for patient 
discharge status. Assessing whether additional home health services are productive is difficult 
because there are no agreed-upon standards of what constitutes necessary or appropriate home 
health care, patients have chronic and overlapping care needs, and even the most basic unit of 
service—the visit—is not specifically defined (U.S. General Accounting Office 2000). 
Nevertheless, if the IPS eliminates productive home health care services, then we would expect 
  4higher mortality, more discharges to an institutional setting and fewer discharges after the goals 
of care have been met. Alternatively, if the services cut under the IPS were not productive, then 
we would not expect a change in discharge status. 
The implications of the IPS for other payer groups are less straightforward. Importantly, 
nearly all home health agencies are certified to care for Medicare and Medicaid patients 
(National Center for Health Statistics 2004). Although there is some specialization by payer type, 
most agencies care for a patient population covered by a variety of payer sources. Medicare is 
the dominant payer of services accounting for just over half of all home health care patients; 
Medicaid, private insurance and other payers cover the remaining patients. Every state Medicaid 
program is mandated to offer home health services to individuals who qualify for federal income 
maintenance payments (e.g., Social Security Income and Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children) and individuals who are “categorically needy.” Services must include visits by 
registered nurses, credentialed home health aide services and medical supplies and equipment. In 
addition, states may choose to cover physical, occupational, and speech therapies and audiology 
services. States reimburse agencies using various methodologies including fee-for-service, 
prospective and cost-based methodologies (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004). As of October 
2004, only a handful of state Medicaid programs had adopted home health care payment systems 
that mirrored the Medicare system. 
There are multiple sources of private insurance coverage for home health care. 
Commercial health care plans such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield generally pay for skilled 
professional home health care services with some cost-sharing provisions. Managed care 
organizations and other group health plans often include coverage for home health care. Other 
sources of private insurance for home health care services include Medigap policies and long-
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negotiated fee between the patient and the provider. Other sources of home health care coverage 
include state and local service programs through the Veterans Administration, the Older 
Americans Act, social services block grant programs, community organizations, the Civilian 
Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), and worker’s 
compensation. 
Depending on the interrelationship among the various payer types, the IPS may have had 
implications for the care of non-Medicare patients. First, there are potential legal, behavioral, and 
economic explanations for why the IPS may have had similar implications for Medicare and non-
Medicare patients. From a legal perspective, providers certified to accept Medicaid or Medicare 
patients are often required by the CMS to provide care of equal quality to all patients, regardless 
of payer type or generosity. However, monitoring and enforcing this uniform quality constraint 
may be quite difficult. From a behavioral perspective, there is a long-standing notion that 
professional norms matter in health care (Arrow 1963). Behavioral constructs such as trust, 
fairness and regret may explain why providers value treating all patients according to the same 
criteria (Frank 2004). From an economic perspective, certain aspects of health care are produced 
jointly for all payer types and may exhibit economies of joint production. For example, an 
agency’s investment in staff training or administrative capacity would benefit all payer types. 
Alternatively, there are reasons to suspect that other payer groups may serve as potential 
substitutes for Medicare-financed home health care. The underlying motivation for this 
substitution may occur at the patient, agency or government level. From the individual’s 
perspective, a decrease in Medicare benefits under the IPS might lead a patient to seek 
alternative coverage from other public or private sources. From an agency’s perspective, the 
  6decrease in the generosity of Medicare payment under the IPS would make other payer groups 
relatively more attractive. From the government perspective, state Medicaid programs are 
thought to employ a “Medicare maximization” strategy whereby Medicaid is the public payer of 
last resort among dual eligibles (Wiener, and Stevenson 1998). In a survey of State Units on 
Aging and Medicaid departments conducted in 1998, three-quarters of the states responded that 
Medicare funding of home health care was maximized (Murtaugh et al. 1999). If Medicare is 
indeed maximized, then a decrease in Medicare payment generosity under the IPS may cause 
case workers to direct the dual eligible population towards Medicaid. 
Finally, the care of non-Medicare and Medicare home health care patients may be 
unrelated. Unlike hospitals or nursing homes, home health care is not based in a common 
institutional setting and spillovers across patients of different payer types may be minimal. If this 
is the case, then the IPS should not have affected the care of non-Medicare patients. 
Some previous research on the interdependence of different funding sources for home 
health care has found a negative relationship between Medicare and Medicaid home health care 
use at the state-level (Cohen, and Tumlinson 1997; Kenney, Rajan, and Soscia 1998; Liu, 
Wissoker, and Rimes 1998). We are aware of only one previous study that examined this issue in 
the context of the IPS (Han et al. 2004).  In this study, the length of home health care use for 
Medicaid or privately insurance patients did not change under the IPS, suggesting that the care of 
Medicare and non-Medicare patients is not related. We build on this earlier work by considering 
the effect of the IPS for different payer groups over a range of outcomes. 
Data and Methods 
  Our study used the 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 waves of the National Home and Hospice 
Care Survey (NHHCS), a nationally representative survey of home and hospice care agencies 
  7and their current and discharged patients conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics. 
The data were collected using a two-stage sampling process. In the first stage, agencies were 
randomly selected (by size) from 24 strata according to agency-type (home health, hospice, or 
mixed), region (Northeast, Midwest, West or South), and location in a metropolitan statistical 
area. An interviewer contacted the administrator (or designee) for each sampled agency and 
collected general information on the agency. In the second stage of the sampling process, up to 6 
current and 6 discharged patients were randomly chosen from each of the selected agencies. 
Patient-level data were obtained via personal interviews with the agency staff member who was 
most familiar with the patient’s care along with a review of the patient records, if necessary. We 
excluded all hospice patients, thus the final samples included 17,029 current and 15,885 
discharged home health patients.  
  To investigate the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, we examine two outcomes 
among current home health enrollees: level of illness at the time of admission and service 
intensity use, and two outcomes among discharged patients: length of use and discharge status. 
From the NHHCS current patient file, we used a list of up to 6 admission diagnoses to calculate a 
Charlson comorbidity score based on the presence of one or more of 18 chronic medical 
conditions; this score is associated with increased mortality (Charlson et al. 1987). Because we 
are ultimately interested in agency behavior towards those sickest patients and because nearly 
half of patients had a Charlson score of 0, we established a “high” Charlson category based on 
whether the individual had a score of 2 or more.  
To model service intensity, we constructed a measure of the number of activities of daily 
living (ADLs) for which the patient received some help from the agency. The six ADL 
categories were bathing, dressing, eating, transferring in or out of beds or chairs, walking and 
  8toileting. Because we are interested in those high service utilization patients, we dichotomized 
this outcome by categorizing patients that received help with 4 or more ADLs. 
  Among discharged patients, length of use was defined as the number of days from 
admission to discharge. Given the skewed nature of length of use, we constructed dummy 
variables measuring discharge within 30 days and discharge within 60 days (Han et al. 2004).  
Finally, we modeled the reason for discharge using four mutually exclusive categories: goals 
met, transfer to an inpatient care setting, death and other. The goals met category consists of 
recovery, stabilization, family and friends resuming care, and services no longer being needed. 
Inpatient care settings include both hospitals and nursing homes. The other category consists of 
those sample persons that were no longer eligible for services, were transferred to some other 
outpatient care setting or moved out of the area. 
  We constructed four primary payer categories: Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance and 
other payer. The other payer category consisted of the following categories: other governmental 
assistance, out-of-pocket, supplemental security income, religious organizations, Veterans 
Administration, CHAMPVA/CHAMPUS, other military medicine, and other. An IPS dummy is 
the key policy variable of interest. Because the IPS was implemented on October 1, 1997, data 
from the 1994 and 1996 waves were assigned to the pre-IPS period and data from the 1998 and 
2000 waves were assigned to the post-IPS period. One potential issue with this assignment for 
the 1998 NHHCS wave is that patients may have been admitted in the period preceding the IPS 
(e.g.,  approximately 18% of Medicare home health patients in the 1998 wave were admitted 
prior to October 1, 1997 (Han, and Remsburg 2003)). Unfortunately, we are not able to correct 
for this issue using the public use NHHCS files, but if anything, this would bias our results 
toward finding no effect of the IPS.  
  9  A number of covariates were included in our multivariate models (see Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics). At the person-level, demographic variables included gender, age, race, 
ethnicity, and marital status. We also included the patient’s referral source (physician, hospital, 
self/family, nursing home, or other), living arrangement (lives alone, institution, or other), and 
presence of a primary caregiver. At the agency level, we controlled for whether the agency was 
for-profit, group-owned, and hospital-based. Finally, we included dummy variables for whether 
the agency was located in a metropolitan statistical area and region of the country (Northeast, 
Midwest, West or South). For race, marital status and the agency-level variables, we also 
included dummy variables for missing observations to maximize our sample size. In the 
discharge analyses, we included dummy variables for the Charlson score, vision difficulty, 
hearing difficulty, and length of use (in modeling discharge destination). 
    I N S E R T   T A B L E   1   H E R E  
The empirical models exploit the panel nature of the NHHCS data to examine the 
implications of the IPS. The initial specification replicates earlier work by conditioning on those 
individuals with Medicare as the primary payer source. We estimate models of the following 
form: 
it t it it YI P S X γ βε =+ +         ( 1 )  
where Yit refers to the outcome measure for patient i at time t, Xit includes an intercept and a set 
of patient and agency level controls, and εit is the error term. IPS is a dummy variable measuring 
those patients surveyed in the 1998 and 2000 waves. Thus, the basic identification strategy 
implicit in Equation (1) relies on comparing outcomes for Medicare patients before and after the 
implementation of the IPS. In order to directly test whether the IPS had implications for non-
Medicare patients, we re-estimate equation 1 conditional on Medicaid, private insurance and 
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interest have changed for other payer groups in the IPS period. 
We analyze whether the implications of the IPS differed for Medicare patients relative to 
non-Medicare patients. Thus, we estimate the following model containing data from all four 
payer groups: 
it t it t it it it it it Y IPS Medicare IPS Medicare Private Other X α γδ φ λ =× + + + + ++ β ε  (2)   
where we include an interaction of the IPS and Medicare variables. The interaction term is the 
key coefficient of interest in this model, allowing us to construct a “differences in differences” 
estimate. Basically, we compare the pre/post difference in outcomes for Medicare patients 
relative to the pre/post difference for non-Medicare patients. The failure to observe significant 
differences across payer types under the IPS would be consistent with the idea that the decrease 
in payment generosity under the IPS had similar implications for Medicare and non-Medicare 
patients. 
Given the binary nature of the outcomes, these models are estimated as probits, but the 
coefficients are presented as marginal probability effects. Thus, the coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted as the percentage point change in the dependent variable following the adoption of 
the IPS. Given the complex survey design, the svy commands in STATA software (version 8.02) 
were used to incorporate the NHHCS weights to account for the unequal probability selection of 
patients and also correct the standard errors for clustering within agencies. Because strata were 
not included on the NHHCS public use file, we constructed this measure using the agency type, 
region and metropolitan statistical area variables (Carlson, Gallo, and Bradley 2004). 
As a final methodological point, the interaction term in a probit model is not directly 
interpretable (Ai, and Norton 2003). Existing software to correct for this issue does not take 
  11account of complex survey weights (Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004). Thus, we estimated Equation 
(2) above using a linear probability model. Once again, the coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted as the percentage point change in the dependent variable. In a set of robustness 
checks excluding the complex survey weights, these results were similar in magnitude and 
precision to the probit marginal probability estimates.  
Results 
  Before examining the full multivariate estimates, we present unadjusted results 
documenting the outcomes of interest by payer type for the pre-IPS and IPS periods (see Table 
2). With a few exceptions, trends in outcomes among Medicare and non-Medicare patients were 
similar over the two periods. For example, across all four payer groups, the proportion of patients 
discharged with the goals of care met increased in the IPS period. Similarly, both Medicare and 
non-Medicare patients were more likely to be discharged within 30 or 60 days in the IPS period. 
On the other hand, the proportion of patients receiving agency assistance for 4+ ADLs declined 
for Medicare and privately insured patients, increased for patients with other payer sources and 
remained relatively consistent for Medicaid patients. Overall, however, these descriptive results 
are suggestive of the idea that the IPS may have had similar implications for Medicare and non-
Medicare patients. 
    I N S E R T   T A B L E   2   H E R E  
The first set of multivariate results examines the implications of the IPS for Medicare 
patients (see Table 3, column 1).
2 The first row explores the hypothesis that the IPS decreased 
access for those sickest patients. As expected, the adoption of the IPS was associated with a 
statistically significant (p<0.05) 3.9 percentage point decrease in the care of Medicare patients 
with a Charlson score of two or more.
 3 The second row examines the relationship of the IPS and 
  12the intensity of agency-provided services. The adoption of the IPS was significantly (p<0.05) 
related to a 4.4 percentage point decrease in agencies assisting patients with four or more 
activities of daily living. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that the IPS decreased 
intensity of services, although an alternative explanation is that the trend towards admitting 
healthier patients resulted in fewer patients needing agency assistance with ADLs. 
   INSERT  TABLE  3  HERE 
The IPS was also hypothesized to result in a less favorable discharge from home health 
care. Thus, we expected an increased number of discharges to death or an institution and a 
decreased number of discharges in which the goals of care were met. However, the IPS was 
significantly (p<0.05) associated with a 1.4 percentage point decrease in deaths among Medicare 
patients, adjusting for other factors, including the Charlson score at admission. The other 
discharge outcomes were not statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, there is no 
support for our hypothesis that patients experienced less favorable discharge outcomes under the 
IPS. 
The final hypothesis regarding the IPS was that it would result in a shorter length of use 
for home health care patients. There is strong support for this hypothesis. Among Medicare 
patients, the IPS was significantly (p<0.01) associated with a 15.4 percentage point increase in 
patients with a length of use less than 30 days and a 15.9 percentage point increase in patients 
with a length of use less than 60 days. 
We next examined the specific implications of the IPS for the Medicaid, privately insured 
and other payer groups. The Medicaid results (column 2) are particularly important given the 
potential substitution of Medicaid and Medicare services under the IPS. Interestingly, there is no 
indication of a substitution across Medicare and Medicaid patients. If anything, the Medicaid 
  13results are generally similar to the Medicare results in terms of the direction and magnitude of 
the estimates. However, given the smaller sample size, the estimates were generally less precise 
with only two of the estimates achieving statistical significance. Among Medicaid patients, the 
IPS was associated with a 6.9 percentage point decline in discharge to institutions and 12.6 
percentage point increase in individuals being discharged within 60 days. 
The results for privately insured patients (column 3) are also quite similar to the Medicare 
results in terms of the direction and magnitude of the effects. Once again however, the standard 
errors are larger, which results in fewer statistically significant findings. Among privately 
insured patients however, the IPS was significantly associated with a decrease in agency 
assistance with 4+ ADLs, a decrease in discharge to death, an increase in discharge after the 
goals of care were met, and increased discharge within 30 and 60 days. 
The other payer category (column 4) looks similar to Medicare in terms of length of use 
but different in the provision of services to individuals with 4 or more ADLs. Specifically, the 
IPS was significantly associated with a 25.5 percentage point increase in discharge by 30 days 
and a 15.4 percentage point increase in discharge by 60 days. The only other statistically 
significant result indicated that the IPS was associated with a 7.2 percentage point increase in 
agency assistance with patients for 4+ ADLs. The other results were not statistically significant. 
The final set of results test whether the effects for Medicare patients under the IPS differ 
relative to non-Medicare patients (see Table 4). Once again, we construct this test by interacting 
Medicare status with the IPS dummy variable. The interaction terms are presented in column 1 
along with the main effects (columns 2 and 3). Across the different outcomes, only the ADL and 
mortality models indicated statistically significant effects. In particular, Medicare patients were 
associated with a 5.1 percentage point decline in high ADL assistance and a 3.3 percentage point 
  14decline in mortality under the IPS relative to non-Medicare patients. Although the other 
interaction terms were not significant, the large standard errors make it difficult to rule out a lack 
of precision in these estimates. 
    I N S E R T   T A B L E   4   H E R E  
Discussion 
Across a range of outcomes, our results are suggestive of common effects under the IPS 
for Medicare and non-Medicare patients. These findings fit into a larger health services literature 
examining the treatment of patients with different payer sources in a common setting. Typically, 
this literature highlights the potential benefits of these arrangements for publicly-insured 
patients. For example, there is evidence that Medicaid patients receive higher quality care when 
cared for along side non-Medicaid patients in both hospitals (Dranove, and White 1998) and 
nursing homes (Grabowski, Angelelli, and Gruber 2005). In recognition of these spillovers, 
policymakers often encourage the integration of publicly-insured patients into mainstream 
medicine. Examples include the Veteran’s Administration requirement that its hospitals be 
affiliated with a teaching hospital, and before it was recently repealed, CMS limiting Health 
Maintenance Organizations in the number of Medicare patients they could accept (Norton 2000). 
Alternatively, this study highlights how a decrease in the generosity of public payment 
had similar effects among Medicare and non-Medicare home health patients. Specifically, the 
IPS was associated with a decrease in Medicare access for those sickest patients, a decline in 
patients receiving agency assistance with 4 or more ADLs, and a decrease in length-of-use. Only 
two outcomes—high ADL assistance and discharge to death—were associated with statistically 
significant differences across Medicare and non-Medicare patients. These results highlight the 
need to think broadly when evaluating policy changes. In the case of the IPS, focusing on 
  15Medicare patients alone may have caused previous analyses of the IPS to underestimate the 
overall effects.  
  From a policy perspective, this observation can be used to help frame a welfare analysis 
of the IPS. Clearly, a full calculation of the welfare implications of the IPS is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but any budgetary savings generated from a decrease in utilization under the IPS 
must be weighed against any negative patient outcomes. As noted above, we found evidence that 
access to home health services declined for those sickest patients under the IPS. With our current 
data, it is not possible to assess the health implications for those individuals who did not receive 
home health care services during the IPS period. For those patients that did receive agency care 
however, our results indicate stable discharge outcomes under the IPS, even after accounting for 
the healthier mix of patients at admission. These findings are similar to earlier work showing no 
decline in patient quality under the IPS (McCall et al. 2003a, 2004). One interpretation of these 
results is that those services eliminated under the IPS may not have constituted beneficial 
services. Once again, there are not agreed-upon standards of what constitutes medically 
necessary or appropriate home health care services. In support of this point, the General 
Accounting Office (2000) has reported wide geographic variation in Medicare home health care 
utilization prior to the implementation of the IPS. For example, Medicare home health care users 
in Maryland received an average of 37 visits in 1997 while users in Louisiana received 161 
visits. This variation in use, which persists after controlling for patient diagnoses, may suggest 
that the decrease in utilization under the IPS represented “flat of the curve” home health care, 
offering few additional benefits for patients. 
  Ultimately, this study highlights some potential welfare gains under the IPS, mainly 
lower utilization without a corresponding decline in patient discharge status, and a potential 
  16welfare loss, worse access to services for those sickest patients. However, we still know 
relatively little about the marginal productivity of home health care services. Moving forward, 
additional data will be necessary to analyze this issue in the context of the Medicare home health 
care PPS currently in place.  
  Although we find evidence consistent with the idea that the IPS had implications for non-
Medicare patients, we recognize the limitation that we cannot separate out the effects of the IPS 
from other factors that may have influenced home health care over this time period. That is, we 
may have misattributed the effects of some other policy or market change over this time period 
to the IPS. This could occur in one of two ways. First, it is possible that the over the same period 
that the IPS affected the care of Medicare patients, there were other policies or changes that had 
implications for privately insured, Medicaid and other patients. Alternatively, it is possible that 
the IPS had no effect for any of these payer groups and we are simply observing secular trends 
across all payer groups. Concurrent changes in the home health environment include Medicare 
antifraud initiatives, the removal of venipuncture as a qualifying service for Medicare home 
health eligibility, more stringent Medicare claims review and sequential billing policies, market 
forces affecting the supply of home health agency employees and technological changes in the 
delivery of services (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 1999). The first three factors 
were targeted towards the Medicare population, and if anything, likely played a relatively minor 
role in the effects observed in this study. The final two factors—the supply of home health care 
workers and technological advances—would have implications for all home health care patients, 
but would not necessarily explain the changes observed under the IPS. Thus, although our study 
design cannot rule out these other factors, it is highly unlikely that they explain our current 
findings. 
  17 Another potential limitation associated with our study is the limited precision in some of 
our estimates. Given that roughly two-thirds of all home health patients are covered by Medicare, 
the nationally-representative NHHCS sample consists of relatively few non-Medicare 
observations. Another limitation of the dataset is the inability to disentangle agency effects given 
a maximum of 6 observations per agency. Agencies that care for predominantly Medicare 
patients should experience the effects of the IPS, while agencies with no Medicare patients 
should not. An alternative empirical strategy to the one utilized here would be to compare the 
implications of the IPS across high and low Medicare agencies. In an evaluation of the adoption 
of the Medicare PPS for skilled nursing facilities, Konetzka and colleagues (2004) employed this 
“differences-in-differences” approach in treating nursing home residents in low-Medicare 
nursing homes as a control for unobserved variation over time within the industry. With the 
NHHCS, we do not have a variable measuring agency payer mix. However, both of these data 
limitations—sample size and the lack of an agency payer mix variable—may be addressable in 
future work using the Outcome and Assessment Information Set (OASIS) data set, CMS-
mandated assessments of all home health care patients at certified agencies. 
In sum, our analyses indicate that the Medicare IPS for home health care services resulted 
in worse access for those sickest patients, a lower intensity of services, and decreased length of 
use. These findings hold for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients. Despite the decline in 
length-of-use, we did not observe significantly worse discharge outcomes even after controlling 
for health at the time of admission. This counterintuitive result could be explained by the fact 
that the utilization eliminated under the IPS may not have been medically necessary. 
Nevertheless, additional research is needed to understand outcomes for patients whose access to 
home health services has been affected. 
  18NOTES
                                                 
1 Although the broad incentives under the Interim Payment System (IPS) are straightforward, the 
details of the payment policy are more complicated (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 
1999). Prior to the Balanced Budget Act (BBA), Medicare reimbursed home health agencies 
based on their actual costs up to an aggregate limit, which was calculated by multiplying the 
national per-visit limit for each of six types of visits by the number of visits of each type 
provided by the agency. The national limit was set at 112 percent of the mean cost for each visit 
type. The BBA introduced two changes to this payment system. First, it added a per-beneficiary 
limit, which was 98 percent of the average per-beneficiary costs for each agency in fiscal year 
1994 (and then adjusted for inflation to 1996-1998 dollars) and the average per-patient cost for 
agencies in the region. 75 percent of an agency’s historical costs are blended with 25 percent of 
the median costs of agencies in the same region. The average per-beneficiary limit for agencies 
that were Medicare certified post-1994 was set at the national median for established agencies. 
Second, the BBA decreased the per-visit cost limits from 112 percent of the national mean cost 
per visit to 105 percent of the national median.  Because the medians were less than the means, 
the reduction ended up exceeding 7 percent. For cost-reporting periods beginning in fiscal year 
1998, Medicare paid agencies the lower of their actual costs, the aggregate per-beneficiary limit, 
or the aggregate per-visit limit. As a note, some minor changes were made to these rules over the 
course of the IPS. 
2 In the primary regression tables, we present only the coefficient estimates that explore our 
primary hypotheses. However, the full regression results for Table 1, column 1 are included as 
appendix Tables 1-3 and the remaining results are available upon request from the authors. 
  19                                                                                                                                                             
3 For both the Charlson Score and activities of daily living measures, our results were robust to 
treating these outcomes as continuous measures. 





1994 wave  0.250  0.189 
1996 wave  0.321  0.279 
1998 wave  0.249  0.274 
2000 wave  0.179  0.258 
    
Medicare 0.602  0.657 
Medicaid 0.174  0.104 
Private Insurance  0.097  0.177 
Other Payer  0.127  0.062 
    
Control variables    
Female 0.666  0.625 
Married 0.301  0.385 
Marital status missing  0.127  0.124 
African American  0.133  0.095 
Other race  0.031  0.040 
Race missing  0.159  0.177 
Hispanic 0.041  0.046 
Lives in Metropolitan Statistical Area  0.785  0.857 
Region: West  0.121  0.167 
Region: South  0.340  0.265 
Region: Midwest  0.225  0.213 
Region: Northeast  0.315  0.356 
Age less than 65  0.281  0.305 
Age 65-74  0.189  0.222 
Age 75-84  0.317  0.306 
Age 85+  0.213  0.168 
Lives alone  0.323  0.261 
Lives in an institution  0.078  0.069 
Referral source: self/family  0.066  0.033 
Referral source: hospital  0.329  0.470 
Referral source: nursing home  0.026  0.024 
Referral source: other  0.216  0.126 
Has primary caregiver  0.740  0.791 
Vision difficulty  --  0.175 
Hearing difficulty  --  0.156 
Charlson score = 0  --  0.466 
Charlson score = 1  --  0.275 
Charlson score = 2  --  0.177 
Charlson score = 3  --  0.044 
Charlson score = 4+  --  0.037 
For profit agency  0.388  0.314 
Ownership missing  0.027  0.013 
Group-owned agency  0.451  0.457 
Group-owned missing  0.040  0.039 
Hospital-based agency  0.299  0.396 
Hospital-based missing  0.041  0.034 








Charlson score of 2 or more 
All 0.27  0.24  0.26 
Medicare 0.30  0.26  0.29 
Medicaid 0.25  0.21  0.23 
Private insurance  0.23  0.23  0.23 
Other payers  0.18  0.18  0.18 
 
Agency assistance with 4 or more Activities of Daily Living 
All 0.24  0.23  0.23 
Medicare 0.25  0.21  0.23 
Medicaid 0.29  0.29  0.29 
Private insurance  0.19  0.11  0.15 
Other payers  0.15  0.32  0.22 
 
Discharged: Death 
All 0.06  0.03  0.04 
Medicare 0.06  0.03  0.04 
Medicaid 0.02  0.05  0.04 
Private insurance  0.04  0.02  0.03 
Other payers  0.10  0.03  0.07 
 
Discharged: Institution 
All 0.18  0.16  0.17 
Medicare 0.20  0.19  0.20 
Medicaid 0.17  0.12  0.15 
Private insurance  0.12  0.07  0.09 
Other payers  0.18  0.16  0.17 
 
Discharged: Goals met 
All 0.64  0.70  0.67 
Medicare 0.62  0.67  0.65 
Medicaid 0.66  0.69  0.68 
Private insurance  0.77  0.85  0.81 
Other payers  0.49  0.59  0.53 
 
Discharged: Other 
All 0.12  0.11  0.11 
Medicare 0.11  0.11  0.11 
Medicaid 0.15  0.13  0.14 
Private insurance  0.08  0.07  0.07 
Other payers  0.08  0.07  0.23 









Length of use less than 30 days 
All 0.38  0.54  0.47 
Medicare 0.35  0.51  0.44 
Medicaid 0.40  0.50  0.45 
Private insurance  0.52  0.66  0.61 
Other payers  0.36  0.61  0.47 
 
Length of use less than 60 days 
All 0.65  0.79  0.73 
Medicare 0.63  0.79  0.72 
Medicaid 0.65  0.72  0.68 
Private insurance  0.76  0.87  0.82 
Other payers  0.56  0.70  0.62 
 
 
















Currently enrolled home health patients      
Number of patients  9,983  2,898  1,617  2,486 














Agency assistance with 4 or 















Discharged home health patients 
    



























































Number of patients  9,257  1,619  1,947  1,417 




























Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models include the variables detailed in Table 1. 
ADLs=activities of daily living  
*** = p<.01; ** = p< 0.05; * = p< 0.10 
  24Table 4: Effect of the Interim Payment System (IPS) on Medicare relative to other payer 
groups 
Dependent variable  IPS*Medicare IPS  Medicare 











Agency assistance with 





























































Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models include the control 
variables detailed in Table 1. 
ADLs=activities of daily living 
*** = p<.01; ** = p< 0.05; * = p< 0.10 
  25Appendix Table 1: Full Medicare regression results: Current Patients 
  High Charlson High ADL 
IPS (post-1997)  -0.039 (0.016) -0.044 (0.019) 
Female  -0.047 (0.018) 0.017 (0.016) 
Married  0.009 (0.021) 0.026 (0.018) 
Marital status missing  -0.045 (0.025) 0.014 (0.027) 
African American  0.024 (0.030) -0.009 (0.023) 
Other race  -0.069 (0.044) 0.081 (0.073) 
Race missing  -0.044 (0.026) -0.017 (0.026) 
Hispanic  0.079 (0.048) 0.063 (0.043) 
Lives in MSA  -0.010 (0.018) 0.023 (0.019) 
Region: West  0.018 (0.028) -0.059 (0.027) 
Region: South  -0.012 (0.024) 0.027 (0.026) 
Region: Midwest  0.009 (0.025) -0.065 (0.025) 
Age 65-74  0.027 (0.036) 0.047 (0.030) 
Age 75-84  -0.007 (0.035) 0.055 (0.025) 
Age 85+  -0.067 (0.037) 0.121 (0.029) 
Lives alone  0.015 (0.022) -0.024 (0.019) 
Lives in an institution  -0.035 (0.032) -0.096 (0.024) 
Referral source: self/family  0.030 (0.040) 0.037 (0.027) 
Referral source: hospital  0.042 (0.021) -0.032 (0.020) 
Referral source: nursing home  0.007 (0.049) 0.012 (0.037) 
Referral source: other  0.003 (0.026) 0.055 (0.026) 
Has primary caregiver  0.025 (0.030) 0.059 (0.020) 
For profit agency  -0.012 (0.019) 0.044 (0.021) 
Ownership missing  -0.035 (0.031) -0.087 (0.032) 
Group-owned agency  -0.023 (0.017) -0.042 (0.019) 
Group-owned missing  0.016 (0.048) -0.045 (0.054) 
Hospital-based agency  -0.008 (0.017) -0.015 (0.019) 
Hospital-based missing  0.028 (0.072) 0.155 (0.101) 
N 9,983  9,983 
  26Appendix Table 2: Full Medicare regression results: Discharged destination  
 Death Institution Goals  Met  Other
IPS (post-1997)  -0.014 (0.006) -0.002 (0.018) 0.009 (0.020)  0.009 (0.012) 
Female  -0.017 (0.007) -0.013 (0.017) 0.056 (0.022)  -0.021 (0.014)
Married  -0.011 (0.006) 0.021 (0.023) 0.011 (0.026)  -0.013 (0.016)
Marital status missing  -0.001 (0.010) -0.022 (0.028) 0.030 (0.036)  -0.003 (0.021)
African American  -0.010 (0.006) 0.001 (0.029) -0.004 (0.035)  0.013 (0.019)
Other race  -0.017 (0.006) -0.022 (0.038) 0.048 (0.046) 0.003  (0.031)
Race missing  0.029 (0.020) -0.012 (0.021) -0.039 (0.038) 0.004  (0.015)
Hispanic  -0.011 (0.008) -0.088 (0.028) 0.154 (0.041)  -0.036 (0.026)
Lives in MSA  -0.016 (0.006) 0.002 (0.016) 0.006 (0.021)  0.011 (0.010)
Region: West  0.012 (0.011) -0.068 (0.022) 0.045 (0.029)  0.028 (0.023)
Region: South  0.013 (0.009) -0.042 (0.024) -0.004 (0.030)  0.044 (0.023)
Region: Midwest  0.004 (0.007) -0.060 (0.022) 0.036 (0.028)  0.038 (0.025)
Age 65-74  0.014 (0.012) -0.050 (0.030) 0.041 (0.044)  -0.005 (0.019)
Age 75-84  0.040 (0.014) -0.019 (0.032) 0.008 (0.048)  -0.031 (0.020)
Age 85+  0.047 (0.017) 0.032 (0.035) -0.038 (0.049)  -0.032 (0.019)
Lives alone  -0.022 (0.005) 0.018 (0.026) 0.020 (0.028)  -0.004 (0.014)
Lives in an institution  -0.002 (0.011) 0.057 (0.029) -0.041 (0.036) -0.007  (0.020)
Referral: self/family  -0.005 (0.015) -0.015 (0.048) 0.033 (0.087) -0.007  (0.025)
Referral: hospital  -0.010 (0.006) -0.004 (0.020) 0.036 (0.025)  -0.019 (0.013)
Referral: nursing home  -0.013 (0.008) 0.030 (0.050) -0.042 (0.064)  0.023 (0.039)
Referral: other  0.025 (0.021) -0.050 (0.024) 0.018 (0.045)  -0.007 (0.019)
Has primary caregiver  0.0001 (0.008) 0.003 (0.026) 0.028 (0.031)  -0.023 (0.017)
For profit agency  -0.005 (0.006) 0.022 (0.021) -0.042 (0.022)  0.025 (0.015)
Ownership missing  -0.001 (0.008) -0.030 (0.043) -0.035 (0.065)  0.059 (0.031)
Group-owned agency  0.004 (0.005) 0.001 (0.018) -0.016 (0.021)  0.007 (0.013)
Group-owned missing  -0.010 (0.011) -0.038 (0.029) 0.016 (0.055)  0.034 (0.054)
Hospital-based agency  -0.005 (0.005) -0.008 (0.019) 0.005 (0.022)  0.011 (0.015)
Hospital-based missing  -0.012 (0.008) 0.060 (0.053) 0.021 (0.051)  -0.043 (0.024)
Charlson score  = 1  0.004 (0.009) 0.071 (0.021) -0.086 (0.026)  0.014 (0.0.14)
Charlson score = 2  0.030 (0.017) 0.084 (0.028) -0.095 (0.042)  -0.011 (0.016)
Charlson score = 3  0.025 (0.016) 0.156 (0.043) -0.154 (0.048)  -0.008 (0.021)
Charlson score = 4+  0.051 (0.022) 0.336 (0.063) -0.337 (0.056)  -0.029 (0.017)
Difficulty seeing  0.013 (0.007) 0.039 (0.021) -0.044 (0.022)  -0.013 (0.012)
Difficulty hearing  0.004 (0.006) 0.015 (0.019) -0.055 (0.024)  0.035 (0.015)
Length of use 30-59 days  0.0003 (0.007) -0.064 (0.017) 0.090 (0.023)  -0.025 (0.015)
Length of use 60-99 days  0.002 (0.007) -0.028 (0.025) 0.064 (0.032)  -0.035 (0.014)
Length of use > 100 days  0.039 (0.015) 0.082 (0.027) -0.178 (0.027)  0.031 (0.020)
N  9,194 9,194 9,194 9,194 
  
  27Appendix Table 3: Full Medicare regression results: length of use (in days) 
  Length of use <30 Length of use <60 
IPS (post-1997)  0.154 (0.021) 0.159 (0.023)  
Female  -0.014 (0.027) -0.025 (0.018) 
Married  0.026 (0.035) 0.008 (0.036) 
Marital status missing  0.001 (0.042) 0.024 (0.036) 
African American  -0.031 (0.033) -0.042 (0.027) 
Other race  -0.066 (0.059) -0.071 (0.065) 
Race missing  -0.010 (0.032) -0.002 (0.033) 
Hispanic  0.082 (0.062) 0.090 (0.037) 
Lives in MSA  0.077 (0.019) 0.090 (0.019) 
Region: West  0.005 (0.038) 0.049 (0.041) 
Region: South  -0.097 (0.033) -0.092 (0.035) 
Region: Midwest  -0.156 (0.032) -0.009 (0.038) 
Age 65-74  -0.046 (0.038) 0.015 (0.036) 
Age 75-84  -0.072 (0.035)  -0.010 (0.031) 
Age 85+  -0.101 (0.041) -0.062 (0.042) 
Lives alone  0.034 (0.032) 0.021 (0.029) 
Lives in an institution  -0.014 (0.037) 0.010 (0.034) 
Referral source: self/family  -0.154 (0.047) -0.211 (0.066) 
Referral source: hospital  0.026 (0.025) 0.024 (0.020) 
Referral source: nursing home  0.075 (0.064) 0.014 (0.048) 
Referral source: other  -0.020 (0.042) -0.020 (0.041) 
Has primary caregiver  0.015 (0.029)  -0.023 (0.024) 
For profit agency  -0.034 (0.027) -0.028 (0.027) 
Ownership missing  -0.080 (0.042) 0.036 (0.042) 
Group-owned agency  0.059 (0.025) 0.032 (0.025) 
Group-owned missing  0.108 (0.044) 0.073 (0.058) 
Hospital-based agency  0.086 (0.024) 0.040 (0.024) 
Hospital-based missing  0.030 (0.051) -0.040 (0.060) 
Charlson score  = 1  -0.058 (0.027) -0.061 (0.022) 
Charlson score = 2  -0.93 (0.029) -0.094 (0.032) 
Charlson score = 3  -0.107 (0.044) -0.105 (0.039) 
Charlson score = 4+  -0.075 (0.053) -0.063 (0.062) 
Difficulty seeing  -0.027 (0.025) -0.017 (0.020) 
Difficulty hearing  0.034 (0.028) 0.005 (0.022) 
N 9,257  9,257 
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